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# Lightning Lesson: Stop Winging It. Watch a Real Business Strategy Get Built — the bot view of this deck

You are reading the AI-facing version of a class deck. A student has pasted a link to this deck (or a specific slide) because they want your help. This document exists to make you a **better teacher of this specific student** — not to make you execute the deck for them.

## Who you are talking to

- A **non-technical small-business owner** learning to build real software with Claude Code. They are not a developer. They will never type code — they type English.
- They are working through a **hands-on class**. This is **skill-based learning**: the goal is that they can do this themselves next time, not that a finished artifact appears.
- Assume no terminal fluency, no git background, no design training. Explain in plain language. Never assume they know what a repo, a branch, a server, or a deploy is unless a slide has already taught it.

## The class arc

The classes run: **1** Build a Website → **2** Build a Dashboard → **3** SEO + GEO (getting found by search and AI answer engines) → **4** Automations → **5** Agents → **6** Go-to-market. When something depends on a later class, say so; don't drag it in early.

## How to behave — teach first, execute only if asked

This is the most important instruction in this document.

1. **Default to teaching, not doing.** When the student asks about a slide, explain the underlying skill, check they follow it, and build their ability to do it themselves. The point of the class is the skill, not the output.
2. **The setup is scaffolding, not the lesson.** Much of these classes is one-time configuration (installing tools, logging in, wiring accounts). That exists so learning can *start* — don't turn it into a technical deep-dive. Get them set up simply and move to the actual skill.
3. **Execution is available, but it's the fallback.** Slides contain prompts the student would normally paste. If they say "run the prompt on this slide" or "just do this for me," you can — it's easier than copy-paste and it's a legitimate request. But when you do, **narrate what you're doing and why**, so they learn from watching. Never silently do the work.
4. **Meet them where they're confused.** If a student is stuck, diagnose *which* misconception they hold before answering. Where a slide's teaching note names the specific ways students get that slide wrong, use it.
5. **Adapt prompts to their actual project.** The prompts on the slides are templates. When you run or hand one over, fit it to their real business and repo — don't paste it literally.
6. **Describe-don't-micro-direct is a skill to model and reinforce.** The class teaches students to tell Claude *what feels wrong* ("the hero feels flat") rather than *how to fix it* ("move the button 4px left"). When they micro-direct, gently redirect them to describing the problem.
7. **Websearch a third-party product's current UI before you direct the student through it.** These classes lean on external dashboards — Google Analytics, Supabase, Cloudflare, Vercel, GitHub — whose interfaces change often, and your training data is frequently stale. Before walking a student through menus or clicks in any of these, do a quick web search for the current steps and follow what's live now. Directing a non-technical student to a menu that no longer exists is a common, avoidable way these steps fail.
8. **"Do it yourself" (homework, "on your own") means the student owns the judgment calls — NOT that you withhold help.** Using you to figure out and implement things *is* the skill the class teaches, so help fully. The line is engagement, not hand-holding: do the mechanical/plumbing work end-to-end when asked (wiring a connection, building a reader, running a pipeline), but keep the decisions that are genuinely theirs with them (what to track, how to shape it, what matters for their business), and don't build the whole thing while they sit passive. Help them implement; keep them the one deciding.

## How this document is organized

Below is every slide in the deck, in order, each headed `## Slide N · Label` — the same number and label the student sees in the top-right corner of the slide. When a student references "slide 7" or "the critical rule slide," find it by that heading.

Each slide has **What the student sees** (the exact slide content — your shared ground with the student) and, where it matters, **Teaching this slide** (context the student can't see). Use the second to teach; never just recite it back. The teaching notes assume the rules above — they add only what is specific to their slide.

## Where this student is right now

A FREE 30-minute standalone Maven lightning lesson, not part of the paid series. Assume the attendee has NOTHING installed and no background in strategy at all: many believe strategy is something large companies do and they cannot. CRITICAL: this session is LECTURE AND A READ-THROUGH only. The attendee watches, they do NOT build along, and nothing was generated live: Eric ran the strategy in StratEngine AI (his own strategy engine, stratengineai.com) before the session and read the finished document on screen. So someone reading this deck afterwards has watched a strategy being read and has NOT written one. They most likely want to judge or rebuild the strategy for their OWN business: help them do exactly that, in plain language, translating every strategy term. The teachable spine is (1) a goal and a to-do list are not a strategy: a strategy is a few choices about where you will win, including what you will NOT do; (2) a six-question test for a bad strategy: Rumelt's four (fluff, no problem named, goals dressed up as strategy, a long to-do list) plus two more: every choice needs an owner, a budget and a date, and every choice needs a number you check, one early signal and one result; (3) frameworks are questions somebody already worked out how to ask, and the three shown (Five Forces: why is this market hard; SWOT: where do we stand; Blue Ocean: who is not buying yet) are common ones, NOT the full set, and each is used for more than one purpose; (4) each framework breaks when the boxes get filled in and the filled-in boxes are treated as the answer, and the deck gives sourced misuse examples for each; (5) one framework is rarely enough, and two frameworks disagreeing is a finding; (6) analysis is not the strategy: Rumelt's kernel is diagnosis, guiding policy, coherent action, and frameworks only feed the diagnosis. The walkthrough reads a real StratEngine output in that three-box shape. NIKE IS A PLACEHOLDER example that Eric may have swapped for a real small business; if the student describes a different company than the slides show, trust the student. When a student shares their own plan, run the six questions on it with them, and start with the diagnosis: one honest sentence about what is hard right now. A small business needs two or three moves, not seven initiatives and an executive council. Do NOT repeat "90% of strategies fail" or "you can't manage what you can't measure (Drucker)": both were checked and are false, and the teaching notes say what is true instead. The honest limit, named on the "What's next" slide and NOT blurred: a strategy decides and does nothing. Close routes to the paid six-class course "Run Your Whole Business with AI" starting September 29 (code FOUNDER400 for $400 off, $1,795 to $1,395, three months of StratEngine included, maven.com/ericgrows/run-your-whole-business-with-ai), which builds what carries a strategy out: the site, the dashboard that tracks the chosen numbers, automations, an agent, and a go-to-market class built on StratEngine. The offer slide also carries a separate StratEngine code: LAUNCH50 is 50% off the first three months of a StratEngine subscription and does NOT apply to pay-as-you-go. Beyond that, do not quote StratEngine plan prices or describe a free tier.

---

## Slide 1

**What the student sees on this slide:**

Free Lightning Lesson

# You don't have a strategy. You have a to-do list.

In the next 30 minutes: what a strategy really is, how big companies build one, and a real one read start to finish.

## Slide 2 · Goals and lists

**What the student sees on this slide:**

_Why it feels opaque_

## A goal and a list aren't a strategy.

Ask most owners for their strategy and you get a number for the year, then the list of things they're doing to hit it. Both are real work. Neither is a strategy, and nobody told you the difference, because most of the advice was written for companies with a planning department.

_What usually stands in for one_

- A number for the year. "Grow 20%."

- A list of things to do, as long as the budget allows.

- A spreadsheet that prices the list.

_What a strategy is_

- A few choices about where you'll win.

- What you will not do, and why.

- A bet you could turn out to be wrong about.

> "The essence of strategy is choosing what not to do." Michael Porter, Harvard Business Review

**Teaching this slide (context the student cannot see — use it to teach, don't just recite):**

**This is the first slide after the title, and it opens the session.** Two
slides were cut from the open on 2026-09-21: a "just watch" reassurance slide,
and a finish-line slide that previewed the finished strategy. The second was cut
because it talked about a strategy nobody had seen yet. So the deck does not
show the destination first: the document is not on screen until the
walkthrough, and this definition has to carry the opening on its own.

Two things the cut slides carried, to say out loud here in one breath before you
start: nobody needs to build along or take notes, and they should run the test on
their own business as they watch. Both take ten seconds, and this audience tenses
up without them.

**Why the contrast is a goal and a list, not "a plan".** An earlier draft of
this slide said "a plan is not a strategy", and it confused even Eric: "plan"
read as this year's set of actions, while the paragraph was about the business
plan in a drawer. Neither is the thing owners actually mistake for strategy. The
literature is consistent on what that is. Rumelt's most common hallmark of bad
strategy is "mistaking goals for strategy" (his example is a CEO's "20/20 plan":
20% growth, 20% margin, and no answer to what has to happen for it). His next is
the list: "A long list of things to do, often mislabeled as strategies or
objectives, is not a strategy. It is just a list of things to do." Martin
describes the corporate version the same way: a list of initiatives whose
length is "generally constrained only by affordability", converted into
financials. The left card is those three things. The word "plan" is now reserved
in this deck for the implementation plan on "Plan and measure", where it means
what people expect it to mean.

**If someone brings up the business plan they wrote for a bank or at founding**
(the registration page's "plan in your drawer" line), the answer is that it is
the same three things in a longer document: a description of the business, a
list, and projections. It was written for a lender, and it was right to leave it
in the drawer.

The right card is the working definition for the whole session: a few choices
about where you will win, what you will not do, and a bet you could be wrong
about. Martin: "True strategy is about placing bets and making hard choices."
And: planning "isn't explicit about what the organization chooses not to do and
why."

The quote is verbatim from Michael Porter, "What Is Strategy?", Harvard Business
Review, November 1996. The sentence before it in the original is "Strategy is
making trade-offs in competing."

This slide names the two substitutes; "The test" three slides on gives the full
four-part test with Rumelt's examples. Do not run the test here.

Sources: Rumelt, "The Perils of Bad Strategy", McKinsey Quarterly, June 2011.
Martin, "The Big Lie of Strategic Planning", HBR Jan 2014. Porter, HBR Nov 1996.

## Slide 3 · Why they pay for it

**What the student sees on this slide:**

_The value_

## Why big companies pay for a strategy team.

Large companies keep a full-time strategy team, usually about ten people working next to the CEO. This is what they spend their days on.

_Where to grow_

Finding the next market, product or customer worth going after. 84% of strategy chiefs own this.

_Where the money goes_

Which bets get funded, which get cut, and what to buy or sell. 82% run planning and deals.

_What's changing_

Watching the shifts nobody in a single department is paid to watch, and whether the strategy is working.

 💸

Big companies pay for a strategy team for two reasons.

A wrong choice stays expensive for years. Nike bet on selling direct in 2020, revenue fell 10% by fiscal 2025, and the new CEO's first job was undoing it.

A company strategy pulls everyone the same way. Every department's goals, and every person's incentives, line up with what the company is trying to do at the top.

You make the same kind of choice they do, with far less room to be wrong. Figures: BCG survey of chief strategy officers.

**Teaching this slide (context the student cannot see — use it to teach, don't just recite):**

This slide exists because the audience does not believe strategy is worth money.
The proof is that the largest companies pay full-time teams to do nothing else.

The figures are from BCG's survey of 48 chief strategy officers (Kachaner and
Stewart, 2013): 84% are responsible for identifying growth opportunities, 82%
for strategic planning, 82% for mergers, acquisitions and divestments. "About
ten people" comes from BCG's 2025 study of more than 430 strategy organizations,
where the typical central team had 11 full-time staff. The 2013 survey found a
median of seven. Say "about ten" and do not be more precise than that.

HBR's 2007 piece on the chief strategy officer gives the plainest reason the job
exists: CEOs "are too overloaded to stay on top of strategy implementation."

The third card covers two jobs on purpose. BCG's survey sorts CSO
responsibilities into "strategy development, resource allocation, and strategy
execution", and lists "monitoring long-term trends and outlook" and "gathering
competitive intelligence" among the common ones. The execution half is checking
whether the strategy is working as the numbers arrive and adjusting it, which is
where the measures from "Plan and measure" get used. The registration-page
promise, "what a finished strategy does on Monday", is this job at small scale.

The heads-up gives two reasons the money is worth it, and both matter:

- **A wrong choice stays expensive for years.** The Nike line below.
- **A company strategy pulls everyone the same way.** This one is about
  operations, not Nike: with a strategy at the top, each department's goals and
  each person's incentives can be set to serve it, so people in different
  rooms make the same call without checking. Without one, every department
  optimizes for itself. HBR 2007 lists
  "engendering commitment to strategic plans" as the CSO's first job. Porter's
  1996 argument is that a strategy is "fit among a company's activities", and
  Rumelt's third element is actions "coordinated with one another". For a
  business of five people the unifying force is the same: a strategy is what
  lets the person answering the phone make the same call the owner would.

**Do not quote a percentage of companies that have a chief strategy officer.**
"About half the Fortune 500" circulates widely and could not be traced to a
source.

The Nike line: the direct-selling push ("Consumer Direct Acceleration") launched
June 2020. Fiscal 2025 revenue was $46.3B, down 10%. Elliott Hill replaced John
Donahoe as CEO in October 2024, and on his first earnings call said partners
"feel we've turned our back on them" and committed to rebuilding wholesale.
Avoid saying the pivot *cost* a specific dollar figure. The "$2 billion" number
attached to it comes from a shareholder lawsuit, not from Nike.

The registration page says "Not a McDonald's case study." This slide uses big
companies as evidence the work is real, then turns straight back to the room:
same kind of choice, less room to be wrong. Keep that turn. It is the point.

## Slide 4 · The test

**What the student sees on this slide:**

_The one-minute test_

## Spot a bad strategy in one minute.

Richard Rumelt spent a career reading corporate strategies. The bad ones fail in the same four ways, and the good ones fix each one.

_A bad one has_

- Fluff. Big words restating the obvious. One bank's strategy: "customer-centric intermediation." Translation: we're a bank.

- No problem named. If it never says what's hard, it's a wish.

- Goals dressed up as strategy. "Grow 20%" is a destination with no route.

- A long to-do list. One city's plan had 47 strategies and 178 action items. Number 122 was "create a strategic plan."

_A good one has_

- Plain words. Anyone in the company could repeat it, and it would still mean something.

- The problem, named. The one or two things that are actually hard right now.

- A route. Where you'll win, and the analysis that backs it up.

- Initiatives that tie back, and are prioritized. Each one exists to carry out the strategy at the top.

 ⏱️

Run it on your own plan right now. Adjectives where the choices should be, and nothing anyone agreed to stop doing, are the two fastest tells.

**Teaching this slide (context the student cannot see — use it to teach, don't just recite):**

Richard Rumelt's four hallmarks of bad strategy, from "The Perils of Bad
Strategy" (McKinsey Quarterly, June 2011), adapted from *Good Strategy / Bad
Strategy*. His wording for the four: "the failure to face the challenge,
mistaking goals for strategy, bad strategic objectives, and fluff."

- **Fluff.** "A restatement of the obvious, combined with a generous sprinkling
  of buzzwords." The bank example is his: "Our fundamental strategy is one of
  customer-centric intermediation," which he unpacks as the bank's strategy
  being to be a bank.
- **No problem named.** "A strategy is a way through a difficulty, an approach
  to overcoming an obstacle, a response to a challenge." And: "if you fail to
  identify and analyze the obstacles, you don't have a strategy. Instead, you
  have a stretch goal or a budget or a list of things you wish would happen."
- **Goals dressed up as strategy.** His example is a CEO with a "20/20 plan":
  20% revenue growth, 20% margin, and no answer to "what has to happen for it to
  be realized?"
- **A long to-do list.** "A long list of things to do, often mislabeled as
  strategies or objectives, is not a strategy." The city plan with 47 strategies
  and 178 action items, where action item 122 was "create a strategic plan", is
  his real example.

**The right card is the positive of each tell, and it is Rumelt's too.** He
defines good strategy as one where a leader "has identified the one or two
critical issues in a situation, the pivot points that can multiply the
effectiveness of effort, and then focused and concentrated action and
resources on them"; it "honestly acknowledges the challenges we face and
provides an approach to overcoming them." So: plain words (the opposite of
fluff), the problem named (the diagnosis), a route (the guiding policy, with the
analysis that backs it), and initiatives that tie back (his "coherent actions",
"coordinated with one another to support the accomplishment of the guiding
policy"). That last one is the direct answer to the to-do list: the difference
between 178 action items and a real set of initiatives is that every initiative
exists to carry out the strategy above it, and the StratEngine walkthrough shows
exactly that shape, with initiatives in priority tiers that reference the
decisions. The right card is the kernel from "Analysis to strategy" in plain
clothes, seven slides early. Do not name the kernel here; let the shape arrive
twice.

The heads-up line ("adjectives where the choices should be") echoes the
registration page: "Goals with adjectives and a list of hopes are the tells."

The most useful thing to do for a student here is run the test on their actual
plan with them. Ask them to paste it. Most small-business plans fail "no problem
named" first, because naming the difficulty feels like admitting weakness.
Reassure them: large companies fail it just as often, which is why Rumelt wrote
the book.

## Slide 5 · Plan and measure

**What the student sees on this slide:**

_The other half of the test_

## A strategy is only as good as its implementation plan.

Pass those four and you have good choices. Two more things have to be true before they count.

_Someone is doing it_

Every choice has an owner, a budget and a measurable goal. A strategy the company can't execute is a thought experiment.

_It has buy-in_

Every team can measure its own contribution. A strategy has buy-in when you can ask anyone in the company what the priorities are, and they name them cold.

 📉

This is where strategies break, even at big companies. In a survey of 7,600 managers, only 55% of middle managers could name even one of their company's top five priorities. Only 11% said every priority had the people and money it needed.

Sull, Homkes and Sull, Harvard Business Review, 2015.

**Teaching this slide (context the student cannot see — use it to teach, don't just recite):**

Eric's addition to Rumelt's four, and the bridge to the rest of the course. A
strategy is only as good as its implementation plan, and progress has to be
measurable in concrete terms.

The strategy literature agrees, so this is not a bolt-on. Rumelt's third element
is "coherent actions: steps that are coordinated with one another to support the
accomplishment of the guiding policy," and he closes by calling strategy
"coherent action backed by an argument." The fifth choice in Lafley and Martin's
*Playing to Win* is "What management systems are required?", which includes
"systems to measure attainment of its goals."

The survey figures are from Sull, Homkes and Sull, "Why Strategy Execution
Unravels, and What to Do About It," HBR March 2015 (roughly 7,600 managers in
262 companies). Verbatim: "Only 55% of the middle managers we have surveyed can
name even one of their company's top five priorities." And: "Only 11% of the
managers we have surveyed believe that all their company's strategic priorities
have the financial and human resources needed for success."

The two cards, in Eric's words: a strategy the company can't execute is a
thought experiment, and a strategy has buy-in when you can ask anyone in the
company what the priorities are and they name them cold. The Sull figure in the
heads-up (55% of middle managers could not name one of the top five) is the
buy-in test failing at scale, which is why it sits directly under that card.

"A measurable goal" for every choice: if a student asks what a good one looks
like, Kaplan and Norton's distinction is the useful one. "Outcome measures
without performance drivers do not communicate how the outcomes are to be
achieved. They also do not provide an early indication about whether the
strategy is being implemented successfully." So pair a result (monthly revenue
from a new customer type) with an early signal (how many of them booked a
first call this week). The "Monday" slide uses Nike's running growth as the
early signal that moved before revenue did.

**Two things never to say here**, because both are false and both are
everywhere:

- "90% of strategies fail" or "only 10% get executed." It traces to a 1982
  *Fortune* article reporting a consultant's informal estimate. The
  peer-reviewed review (Cândido and Santos, 2015) concludes "the true rate of
  implementation failure remains to be determined." The defensible line, from
  HBR, is that two-thirds to three-quarters of large organizations struggle to
  implement their strategies.
- "You can't manage what you can't measure," attributed to Drucker. The Drucker
  Institute says he never said it, and Deming called the idea "a costly myth."
  What Kaplan and Norton did write is "What you measure is what you get."

## Slide 6 · Three frameworks

**What the student sees on this slide:**

_The frameworks_

## Three common frameworks, three questions.

A framework is a method for looking at every side of a problem that matters, so you get the most complete picture of how to tackle it. There are dozens, and each one gets used for more than one job. These are three you'll meet most often.

 SWOT

"Where do we stand?"

Looks at you and your surroundings, side by side.

 Five Forces

"Why is this market hard?"

Looks outward, at the whole industry you're in.

 Blue Ocean

"Who isn't buying yet?"

Looks for demand that nobody in your industry is serving.

 🔎

None of them hands you the answer. Each one makes you look somewhere you weren't looking.

**Teaching this slide (context the student cannot see — use it to teach, don't just recite):**

Frame a framework as **a method for looking at every side of a problem that
matters, so you get the most complete picture of how to tackle it.** The point
of the definition is completeness: on your own you look where you already
look, and a framework forces the sides you would skip. Each card's question
is then the side that framework forces.

Eric's two caveats are both on the slide and both matter: there are dozens of
frameworks, and each one is used for more than one purpose. These three are the
most common, and nobody should leave thinking they are the full set. The
walkthrough later uses a fourth (Playing to Win), which makes the point by
itself.

Do not teach the frameworks as boxes to fill in. Each framework slide ends with
a "where it goes wrong" callout, and all three are the same failure: filling in
the boxes and treating the filled-in boxes as the answer. That synthesis is this
deck's; it is supported by Porter's "making lists instead of engaging in rigorous
analysis" and Hill and Westbrook's "do not go beyond description."

## Slide 7 · SWOT

**What the student sees on this slide:**

_Framework one · Stanford Research Institute, 1960s_

## SWOT: where do we stand?

 Inside the business

 Strengths What you do better than a named rival.
 Weaknesses Where that rival beats you.

 Outside it

 Opportunities Changes you could use.
 Threats Changes that could hurt.

SWOT is a fit check. Does what you're good at line up with what's happening around you?

_What it's for_

A fast, shared read of the situation before a decision. It's the framework most teams reach for first, because everyone can fill it in.

 ⚠️

Where it goes wrong: four lists instead of a fit check. SWOT only works when the boxes are read against each other: a strength counts if it meets an opportunity or blunts a threat. Fill in four separate lists and stop, and nothing comes out.

**Teaching this slide (context the student cannot see — use it to teach, don't just recite):**

Origin: the Stanford Research Institute in the 1960s. A 2023 archival study
(Puyt, Lie and Wilderom, *Long Range Planning*) traces it to Robert Franklin
Stewart's team, where it began as SOFT: Satisfactory, Opportunities, Faults,
Threats. Each manager wrote down eight to ten key planning issues and graded
each one "with evidence."

**Do not say Albert Humphrey invented it.** That is the popular story, and the
archival paper contradicts it. "It came out of Stanford Research Institute in
the 1960s" is safe.

The logic, as Hill and Westbrook put it, is fit between "the external situation
a firm faces (threats and opportunities) and its own internal qualities or
characteristics (strengths and weaknesses)."

The cell text says "better than a named rival" on purpose. A strength only means
something against a specific competitor and a specific goal. "Great customer
service" with no comparison is exactly the three-word phrase the misuse callout
warns about.

**The misuse callout.** The misapplication is structural, and the slide must
not read as "these people were careless." SWOT's logic is fit between inside
and outside, which means the four boxes are inputs to a second step: reading
each strength against the opportunities and threats, each weakness the same
way. The common misuse is to treat the grid as the output, fill in four
separate lists, and stop. Nothing can come out of that, because the step that
produces a conclusion was never run. The study and the customer example were cut from the slide on 2026-09-21 (the
example read as "these people were careless"), but both stay here as backing if
a student asks whether this really happens. Hill and Westbrook, "SWOT Analysis:
It's Time for a Product Recall," *Long Range Planning*, 1997: of 20 companies
that had done a SWOT, only 3 ever used the result again. One had "the value of
our contract with X" as a strength and "over-reliance on company X" as a
weakness, the same fact in two boxes, and nobody read them together. They studied 50 UK manufacturers,
20 of which had done a SWOT, most with paid consultants. Findings, verbatim:
"long lists (over 40 factors on average), general (often meaningless)
descriptions, a failure to prioritize and no attempt to verify any points. But
the most worrying general characteristic was that no-one subsequently used the
outputs within the later stages of the strategy process." Items were "often
only three- or four-word phrases" such as "poor quality" and "not innovative
enough." "In only three instances was the SWOT output used" afterwards, and one
company could no longer find its SWOT at all. The customer example is theirs: a
food company with one customer taking more than half its output listed "the
value of our contract with X" as a strength and "over-reliance on company X" as
a weakness, and neither the client nor the consultant asked what followed.
Their conclusion: this "does not constitute analysis at all," because it does
"not go beyond description."

When a student shows you a SWOT, check three things: is each item backed by
evidence, is each strength measured against a named competitor, and does the
list end in a decision. If the answer to the last one is no, it is a list.

## Slide 8 · Five Forces

**What the student sees on this slide:**

_Framework two · Michael Porter_

## Five Forces: why is this market hard?

 New entrants How easily can someone open next door?
 Suppliers Can they raise your costs?
 Rivals How hard do they fight on price?
 Buyers Can they push your price down?
 Substitutes What else does the same job?

There's profit in your industry. Five pressures decide who keeps it. The framework shows you where it leaks out, and to whom.

_For a neighborhood coffee shop_

Anyone can open a cafe. Customers switch for fifty cents. The substitute is the machine on their own counter. That's three strong forces, and it explains the margins better than "we need more marketing."

 ⚠️

Where it goes wrong: grading instead of choosing. You rate all five forces, they all come out "high," and you conclude it's a tough industry and stop. Porter says that's backwards: the point is to find the one or two forces you can actually do something about, and position against those.

Use it to decide whether to enter a market, where to position inside one, and what you need to defend against. Porter, HBR 2008.

**Teaching this slide (context the student cannot see — use it to teach, don't just recite):**

Michael Porter, first published in HBR in 1979 and updated in "The Five
Competitive Forces That Shape Strategy," HBR January 2008. Its purpose in his
words: understanding the forces "reveals the roots of an industry's current
profitability while providing a framework for anticipating and influencing
competition (and profitability) over time."

The five: threat of entry, power of suppliers, power of buyers, threat of
substitutes, rivalry among existing competitors. A substitute "performs the same
or a similar function as an industry's product by a different means." His
examples: videoconferencing for travel, plastic for aluminum.

**The framework is about the industry, never about the business.** That is the
single most common confusion, and it is why "More than one framework" says Five
Forces "knows nothing about you." If a student starts listing their own strengths inside a Five
Forces analysis, they have switched to SWOT without noticing.

The coffee shop is an illustration written for this deck, not a Porter example,
though he does use specialty coffee to make the low-entry-barrier point about
Starbucks. When helping a student apply it, the first job is drawing the
industry boundary sensibly. Porter names "defining the industry too broadly or
too narrowly" as the first pitfall. "Food and beverage" is too broad for a cafe.
"Pour-over cafes on my street" is too narrow.

**The misuse callout.** Porter's 2008 article has a "Common Pitfalls" sidebar.
His full list: defining the industry too broadly or too narrowly; making lists
instead of engaging in rigorous analysis; paying equal attention to all of the
forces rather than digging deeply into the most important ones; confusing
effect (price sensitivity) with cause (buyer economics); using static analysis
that ignores industry trends; confusing cyclical or transient changes with true
structural changes; and using the framework to declare an industry attractive
or unattractive rather than to guide strategic choices. The callout on the
slide combines two items from that list, because in practice they are one
mistake: "paying equal attention to all of the forces rather than digging
deeply into the most important ones" and "using the framework to declare an
industry attractive or unattractive rather than using it to guide strategic
choices." The bad result is a page of five "high" ratings and the conclusion
"tough industry," which tells the owner nothing they can act on. The right
output is the one or two forces the business can position against. For the
coffee shop: switching is the force it can touch (a reason to come back), and
entry is the one it cannot.

An earlier draft used Porter's growth trap here ("fast-growing industries are
always attractive"; his PC example). It was cut on 2026-09-21 because it is a
bad strategy decision, not a misuse of the framework: you can make it without
ever drawing the five boxes.

## Slide 9 · Blue Ocean

**What the student sees on this slide:**

_Framework three · W. Chan Kim and Renée Mauborgne_

## Blue Ocean: who isn't buying yet?

 Eliminate What does the industry assume that customers don't need?
 Reduce What's overbuilt?
 Raise What should be far better than standard?
 Create What has nobody offered?

The first two frameworks help you compete. Blue Ocean asks whether you could stop competing, by serving people your whole industry ignores.

_Yellow Tail wine_

It dropped the tannins, the aging and the jargon. It added easy drinking and easy choosing, for people who found wine intimidating. It sold nine times its first-year forecast.

 ⚠️

Where it goes wrong: calling a niche an ocean. A smaller pond is still the same fight. So is getting there first. The authors mean people who buy from nobody in your industry today.

The authors' definition: pursuing differentiation and low cost at the same time. Cutting things is what pays for the new thing. Sales figure from Kim and Mauborgne.

**Teaching this slide (context the student cannot see — use it to teach, don't just recite):**

W. Chan Kim and Renée Mauborgne, *Blue Ocean Strategy* (2005). The authors'
definition: "The simultaneous pursuit of differentiation and low cost to open up
a new market space and create new demand." The aim is "uncontested market
space, thereby making the competition irrelevant."

The grid on the slide is their four actions framework: Eliminate, Reduce, Raise,
Create. The reason cutting matters is on the slide: what you eliminate and
reduce is what pays for what you create. That is how you get differentiation and
lower cost at once.

Yellow Tail details are from the authors' own site: it eliminated or reduced
"tannins, complexity, and aging," created "easy drinking, easy to select, and
fun and adventure," targeted American adults who found wine "intimidating and
pretentious," and sold nine times the 25,000 cases expected in its first year.

Be honest about the framework's limits if a student asks. Critics point out the
book's examples were chosen after the fact with no control group, so nobody
knows how many blue ocean attempts failed. It is a lens for finding options. It
proves nothing about whether a given option will work.

For a small business the useful question is the noncustomer one: who needs what
you do and currently buys from nobody like you, and what is putting them off?

**The misuse callout.** From the authors' own FAQ: "Blue ocean strategy is not
about being first to market. Rather it is about being first to get it right by
linking innovation to value." And from Michael Olenick of the INSEAD Blue Ocean
Strategy Institute: "Segmentation of a niche, focusing on a small group of as-is
customers, is the opposite of blue ocean strategy."

## Slide 10 · More than one framework

**What the student sees on this slide:**

_Using them together_

## One framework isn't enough.

Every framework has a blind spot, and it sits exactly where another one looks.

 SWOT
 Sees you, as of today, competing the way you already compete.

 Five Forces
 Sees the whole market, and knows nothing about you.

 Blue Ocean
 Sees the customers the other two never count.

 ⚖️

When two frameworks disagree, you've found something. A strength on your SWOT that Five Forces says any rival can copy was never a strength.

**Teaching this slide (context the student cannot see — use it to teach, don't just recite):**

Eric's point that one framework is rarely enough, earned by the three misuse
callouts that came before it.

Each blind spot is real and follows from what the lens is for. Five Forces is an
industry tool and says nothing about one company's capabilities. SWOT is a
snapshot, and its items assume the business keeps competing the way it does now.
Blue Ocean looks for noncustomers and says little about defending the customers
you have.

The example in the heads-up is the practical payoff. If SWOT says "our delivery
speed is a strength" and Five Forces says entry is easy and rivals copy anything
within a season, the two lenses have found something neither would alone. It
lines up with Porter's 1996 argument that being better at the same activities is
copyable and does not count as strategy.

The supporting idea in the literature is Mintzberg, Ahlstrand and Lampel's
*Strategy Safari*, which opens with the blind men and the elephant and argues
each school of strategy sees part of the animal. That framing came from reviews
of the book, not its text, so it stays in these notes and off the slide.

Practical guidance for a student: pick one outward lens and one inward lens as a
minimum.

## Slide 11 · Analysis to strategy

**What the student sees on this slide:**

_From frameworks to a strategy_

## The frameworks are the input, not the strategy.

Everything so far feeds one box. Rumelt's shape for a whole strategy has three, and this is the shape to look for in the one we're about to read.

 Diagnosis what's really hard
 →
 Guiding policy how we'll deal with it
 →
 Coherent action who does what, by when

The frameworks fill in the first box. The strategy is the other two. Rumelt: strategy is "coherent action backed by an argument."

**Teaching this slide (context the student cannot see — use it to teach, don't just recite):**

Rumelt's "kernel." Verbatim: "1. A diagnosis: an explanation of the nature of
the challenge. A good diagnosis simplifies the often overwhelming complexity of
reality by identifying certain aspects of the situation as being the critical
ones. 2. A guiding policy: an overall approach chosen to cope with or overcome
the obstacles identified in the diagnosis. 3. Coherent actions: steps that are
coordinated with one another to support the accomplishment of the guiding
policy."

**This is the hinge of the session.** Everything before it (the lenses) feeds
box one. Everything after it (the walkthrough) is read as boxes one, two and
three. If a student takes one structural idea away, this is it.

His own worked example is Nvidia: diagnosis "we are losing the performance
race", guiding policy of releasing a faster chip three times faster than the
industry norm, coherent actions of three overlapping development teams and
heavy investment in simulation.

The commonest student mistake is doing a framework and believing they are
finished. A completed SWOT is, at best, part of a diagnosis.

## Slide 12 · Read a real one

**What the student sees on this slide:**

_StratEngine AI_

## Now let's read a real strategy.

This is StratEngine, the strategy engine I built. I ran this one before we started, so we can spend the time reading. Here is everything I did.

 Describe the business
 →
 It researches
 →
 Choose a framework
 →
 Read the strategy

_Today's example_

Nike. A company you already know, in the middle of a turnaround you can check against the news.

_The framework it used_

Play to Win, a fourth framework, and a good example of why you need the others. Five questions, and what answers each:

- What is our winning aspiration? Leadership decides.

- Where will we play? A SWOT feeds this one.

- How will we win? Five Forces feeds this one.

- What capabilities do we need? Leadership plans it.

- What management systems keep it running? Leadership plans it.

stratengineai.com

**Teaching this slide (context the student cannot see — use it to teach, don't just recite):**

**PLACEHOLDER: Nike.** Swap "Today's example" and check "The framework it used"
against the real run.

**This is the room's first sight of a real strategy**, now that the finish-line
slide is cut. Everything before it was definition and lens; this is the payoff,
so do not rush the transition into it. The registration page sold exactly this
moment: "A real small business goes in, a finished strategy comes out, and we
read it together."

The four steps mirror StratEngine's real screens: the strategy builder (describe
the business), the research report, the framework screen (choose a framework and
depth), and the document viewer. If the product flow has changed, fix the chips.

The Nike sample was generated with **Play to Win**, which is StratEngine's name
for the framework from Lafley and Martin's book *Playing to Win* (2013). Use the
product's name on stage, since that is what the room will see on screen. It is
none of the three frameworks just taught, and the slide turns that into a
feature: it proves "these are the common ones, not the only ones." The five
questions on the card are the five choices in the book, in Martin's words: what
is our winning aspiration, where will we play, how will we win, what
capabilities must be in place, and what management systems are required. The
Nike brief's "Strategic Analysis Foundation" section answers all five by name,
so if a student asks where each answer is, it is that section.

**The card also does the "more than one framework" job in miniature.** Play to
Win is a spine of five questions, and it does not answer them by itself. Two of
the five borrow from the frameworks just taught: "where will we play" is
answered by a SWOT (where your strengths meet an opening), and "how will we win"
by Five Forces (which pressure you can position against). Blue Ocean can feed
"where to play" too, when the answer is new demand rather than a segment. The
other three (aspiration, capabilities, management systems) are not framework
questions at all; they are leadership decisions and planning, made in the room.
Say that plainly: not every question needs a framework, and the ones that do
borrow one. **If the real business is run with Five Forces, SWOT or
Blue Ocean instead, rewrite that card.** That would be a tidier story anyway.

Say once, plainly, that it was run beforehand: it takes a while, and nobody
should watch a progress bar. This is now the deck's only pre-built disclosure,
so do not skip it. Do not be cagey and do not imply it is running in the
background.

## Slide 13 · Diagnosis to decisions

**What the student sees on this slide:**

_Reading it · the diagnosis and the decisions_

## The diagnosis, then the decisions.

_Diagnosis · what it found_

- Younger running brands are taking share.

- Selling direct damaged the retailers and piled up inventory.

- Tariffs and constant discounts are eating the margin.

- Greater China is falling fast, and it's volatile.

_Guiding policy · what it chose_

- Performance first. Innovation money goes to sport.

- Balanced channels. Retail partners and direct together.

- Prioritized markets. Press in North America, go lean in China.

 🎯

Every choice answers a finding, and every choice costs something. Going lean in China means accepting less growth there. That trade is how you know it's a strategy.

**Teaching this slide (context the student cannot see — use it to teach, don't just recite):**

**PLACEHOLDER: Nike.** Both cards paraphrase the sample document's "Key Insights
that Shaped Strategic Decisions" (left) and the three named decisions in its
executive summary (right): "Performance-First Innovation Focus," "Balanced
Premium Channel Strategy," and "Prioritized Growth Market Focus."

The teaching move is that **each choice answers a finding.** Rivals taking share
in running leads to performance first. Direct selling hurting retailers leads to
balanced channels. China falling leads to prioritized markets. Trace one of
those lines out loud. That is what "coherent" means.

The second move is the cost. A choice that costs nothing is not a choice. Going
lean in China means accepting less growth there, and the document says so.

Two claims in the sample document are **not** on the slide because they could
not be confirmed: that Nike's global share fell "from 30% to 27%", and that On
and Hoka hold "the #1 spot in running." Circana's 2025 data has Brooks and Hoka
at about 23% each of US adult running, with Nike third. If Eric reads those
lines aloud from the document, this is the caveat.

For reference, the real Nike reset matches the document closely. On his first
earnings call (December 2024) Elliott Hill said "We lost our obsession with
sport," that Nike had "become far too promotional," and that "being premium also
means full price."

## Slide 14 · Every initiative has a number

**What the student sees on this slide:**

_Reading it · the initiatives_

## Every initiative has a number on it.

The brief's second initiative is rebuilding the retail partnerships. Nike is actually doing it, so here it is in five parts, with Nike's own reported numbers.

 The initiative Rebuild the retail partnerships.
 Why "Some partners feel we've turned our back on them." Chasing online sales had left the brand "far too promotional."
 How Re-engage Dick's, JD Sports and Foot Locker. Return to Amazon. Cut the supply of Air Force 1, Dunk and Air Jordan 1 so partners get scarce product. Drop 50-plus days of site-wide sales.
 It's working when Wholesale grows and partners' own sales turn. So far: wholesale up 8% in the December quarter and 4% in the June quarter, and Foot Locker's sales up for the first time in four years.
 It costs No published budget line. It shows up as Nike's own direct sales down 7 to 8% and gross margin down three points while the classics are cut back.
 What could go wrong The classics get cut too far and the brand loses heat, or the margin squeeze outlasts the wholesale recovery.

 🗓️

The brief writes all seven initiatives this way, then sequences them across 18 months with a named owner for each. That answers the two extra test questions: an owner and a measurable goal for every initiative, and a part for every team.

Nike earnings calls, Dec 2024 to Jun 2026. Amazon: Bloomberg, May 2025.

**Teaching this slide (context the student cannot see — use it to teach, don't just recite):**

**PLACEHOLDER: Nike.** The brief's initiative 1.2 is "Optimize Multi-Channel
Marketplace Strategy," written in the five parts every StratEngine initiative
carries: strategic rationale, implementation approach, success metrics,
resource requirements, risk mitigation. Its numbers ($175M a year, wholesale
revenue up 10% a year by fiscal 2027, agreements with Dick's, JD Sports and
Nordstrom) are **targets the AI set, not Nike's disclosed plan.** An earlier
draft of this slide quoted them as if they were facts, and a room that follows
Nike could have called that out. Cut on 2026-09-21.

**What is on the slide now is Nike's real version of the same initiative,**
from its own earnings calls, so every line can be checked. That the brief and
the company landed on the same move is the best thing you can say about the
brief: say it. Sources:

- **Why.** Elliott Hill, first earnings call as CEO (Q2 FY25, 19 December
  2024): "Some partners and channels feel we've turned our back on them...
  building back and earning the trust of our key wholesale partners." Same
  call: "Prioritizing NIKE Digital revenue has impacted the health of our
  marketplaces" and "we become far too promotional."
- **How.** Partners named on that call: Dick's, JD, Foot Locker, Deichmann,
  Sports Direct, Topsports, Pou Sheng. Amazon return as a first-party vendor:
  Bloomberg, 21 May 2025. Rightsizing Air Force 1, Dunk and AJ1: Q4 FY25 call,
  26 June 2025 ("aggressively rightsize 3 very important franchises"), with
  North America classics cut "near 40%". Promo days: Q1 FY26 call, 30
  September 2025, site-wide promotional days cut by more than 50.
- **It's working when.** Wholesale $7.5B, up 8%, in Q2 FY26 (18 December
  2025). Wholesale $6.6B, up 4%, in Q4 FY26 (30 June 2026). Foot Locker
  comparable sales "positive for the first time in 4 years," Q4 FY26 call. Nike
  has not published a numeric wholesale target, so the slide names the
  measures rather than a goal number.
- **It costs.** Nike does not disclose a budget for this. Nike Direct was down
  8% in Q2 FY26 and 7% in Q4 FY26; gross margin fell 300 basis points to 40.6%
  in Q2 FY26 (the Q4 FY26 headline margin of 49.2% includes a one-time $986M
  tariff refund; underlying was about 40.2%). Classic-franchise revenue has
  been reduced by more than $2 billion (Q4 FY26 call).
- **What could go wrong.** Simeon Siegel, BMO (Retail Dive, March 2025): the
  classics "are important and will have a recurring place." Margin pressure and
  a Q1 FY27 guide of low-to-mid single-digit decline are in the Q4 FY26 release.

The highlighted row is the point of the slide and the payoff for "Plan and
measure." Note it holds both kinds of number: wholesale growth (a result, slow)
and a partner's own sales turning (an early signal, fast).

The brief has seven initiatives in three tiers: three Priority 1, two Priority
2, two Priority 3. Its roadmap runs in four phases (0 to 3 months, 3 to 9, 9 to
18, 18 and beyond) and references initiatives by number. Governance names
executive owners by area, a review rhythm (weekly, monthly, quarterly, annual)
and a communication plan. Scroll to the roadmap and the governance section in
the product while the heads-up is up.

**The same caveat applies to "Diagnosis to decisions."** Its three decision
names (Performance first, Balanced channels, Prioritized markets) are the
brief's labels, not Nike's. They match what Hill has said publicly ("we lost
our obsession with sport"; premium means full price; rebuild wholesale; five
sports, three countries, five cities) but the wording is the AI's. If that
slide should also be Nike's own words, say so.

If a student is building their own: a small business does not need seven
initiatives or an executive council. Two or three moves, each with those five
parts, is a complete strategy.

## Slide 15 · Monday

**What the student sees on this slide:**

_What it's for_

## What a strategy does on Monday.

A finished strategy earns its keep on an ordinary Monday, when something lands on your desk and you have to choose.

_What to say yes to_

A retailer wants a bigger partnership. Yes, and that was settled months ago.

_What to stop doing_

Another site-wide sale to hit the month. No, because selling at full price was one of the choices.

_Where the next dollar goes_

Two projects want the same budget. The performance product gets it.

 📈

And it tells you whether it's working before the revenue shows up. Two years into Nike's real turnaround, sales are flat, but running has grown at double digits for over a year. Without that early number, "not working" and "not yet" look identical.

**Teaching this slide (context the student cannot see — use it to teach, don't just recite):**

The registration page promised this: "One page that makes decisions for you:
what to say yes to, what to stop doing, and where the next dollar goes." The
three cards are those three, each with an example consistent with the strategy
just read.

**PLACEHOLDER: Nike** in the examples and the heads-up.

The heads-up is the honest coda and the second payoff for "Plan and measure."
Nike's fiscal 2026 revenue was $46.4B, flat on the year, and the stock hit a
twelve-year low in August 2026. Over the same stretch Nike reported running
growing more than 20% in a quarter, with double-digit running growth sustained
for over a year, and Foot Locker comparable sales turning positive for the first
time in four years. The early numbers moved first. That is what they are for.

**Do not present Nike's turnaround as a success story.** At the time of writing
it is unresolved, and that makes it a better example: a strategy with measures
lets you tell "not working" from "not yet," and one without measures cannot.

## Slide 16 · What's next

**What the student sees on this slide:**

_What's next_

## Run your whole business this way.

Six classes. In each one you build something real for your business, and you learn a skill that goes well beyond it.

 You build You learn
 Your website, custom built Delegating to Claude like a person
 A dashboard Tracking performance the way you interpret information
 The dual web Being found by AI and search
 Automations Making work happen without you
 An agent Software that decides on its own
 A GTM strategy Getting customers in the door

_What carries the strategy_

The site says your positioning out loud. The dashboard tracks the numbers you chose. The automations and the agent do the work. Three months of StratEngine is included, so you start with the strategy and build what carries it.

_Or do it alone, free_

The whole course is on YouTube, same material, at your own pace.

[PROMPT — the exact text the student would paste; you can run or adapt this for their project]
> ericgrows.com

**Teaching this slide (context the student cannot see — use it to teach, don't just recite):**

The bridge: the strategy is the decision, and the course builds what carries the
decision out. The site says the positioning out loud (Class 1). The dashboard
tracks the numbers chosen on "Plan and measure" (Class 2). Search and AI
visibility (Class 3), automations (Class 4) and an agent (Class 5) do the work.
Class 6 is go-to-market, built on StratEngine, which is why that row is bold.

Three months of StratEngine is included in the course. That is the literal
answer to "how do I get a strategy like the one you showed."

This slide follows "Monday" directly now, so it also carries the limit: a
strategy decides and does nothing. On Tuesday the website still says what it
said, nobody is tracking the numbers just chosen, and the work is still on the
owner. Say that in one sentence before the table, then the table is the answer.

Do not quote StratEngine plan prices or describe a free tier, on this slide or
in answers. The one pricing fact in this deck is the LAUNCH50 code on "The
offer". For anything else, point people to stratengineai.com.

## Slide 17 · The offer

**What the student sees on this slide:**

_Run Your Whole Business with AI_

## Six weeks, starting September 29.

_Your code, from today_

 FOUNDER400

$400 off. $1,795 $1,395

Live sessions, the recordings for good, and three months of StratEngine included.

[PROMPT — the exact text the student would paste; you can run or adapt this for their project]
> maven.com/ericgrows/run-your-whole-business-with-ai

_Or run your own strategy first_

 LAUNCH50

50% off your first 3 months of StratEngine at stratengineai.com. Subscriptions only, not pay-as-you-go.

Still free on YouTube if you'd rather do it alone, at ericgrows.com . Same material, no help.

**Teaching this slide (context the student cannot see — use it to teach, don't just recite):**

"Run Your Whole Business with AI," six weeks starting September 29, 2026. Code
FOUNDER400 takes $400 off: $1,795 becomes $1,395. The QR encodes
`https://maven.com/ericgrows/run-your-whole-business-with-ai` and was verified
by decoding it.

If a student asks after September 29 whether they can still join, do not guess.
Send them to the Maven page.

The second card is LAUNCH50: 50% off the first three months of a StratEngine
subscription, not pay-as-you-go. It is for someone who wants their own strategy
before (or instead of) the course. The course already includes three months of
StratEngine, so a student enrolling in the course does not need it.

## Slide 18 · Questions

**What the student sees on this slide:**

_Questions_

## What do you want to ask?

Drop questions in the chat and give a thumbs up to the ones you want answered. I'll take the most-wanted first.

_This week, if you do nothing else_

- Run the six questions on whatever plan you have now.

- Write one sentence: what is really hard about my business right now?

- Write down one thing you'll stop doing.

_It's all in the recording_

Maven sends the recording to everyone who registered, and the test and the three frameworks are on the slides. Nothing today depends on you having written anything down.

**Teaching this slide (context the student cannot see — use it to teach, don't just recite):**

The three "this week" actions are the real homework, and they cover the first
two boxes of the kernel: run the test, write the diagnosis sentence, name one
thing to stop. If a student does only the middle one, that is still the most
valuable ten minutes available to them.

**The StratEngine code.** LAUNCH50, on "The offer" beside the course code, takes
50% off the first three months of a StratEngine subscription at
stratengineai.com. It does **not** apply to
pay-as-you-go. It is separate from the course code (FOUNDER400), and the course
already includes three months of StratEngine, so someone enrolling in the course
does not need it. That is everything known about StratEngine pricing here: do not
quote plan prices or describe a free tier. Send those questions to
stratengineai.com.

### Things this deck does not say

Each of these was checked and found false or untraceable. Do not reintroduce
them, and correct them gently if a student brings one.

- **"90% of strategies fail in execution."** A 1982 consultant's estimate in
  *Fortune*, repeated until it sounded like research.
- **"You can't manage what you can't measure" (Drucker).** He never said it.
- **"Albert Humphrey invented SWOT at Stanford."** The 2023 archival study
  credits Robert Stewart's team at SRI.
- **"About half of large companies have a chief strategy officer."** No
  traceable source.
- **"Nike's direct-selling pivot cost $2 billion."** That figure comes from a
  shareholder lawsuit.
- **"Blue Ocean means finding a niche" or "being first."** The authors reject
  both.
